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1 Introduction
The importance of leverage in alleviating manager-shareholders agency conflicts is well
recognized in the finance literature. Although stockholders want managers to make optimal
(value-maximizing) choices on their behalf, managers might have a personal agenda and derive
utility from consuming perks. Leverage induces the obligation to pay out cash, because the
coupon payments on the bond are not at the management’s disposal. If the obligations are not
met, creditors can have a firm declared bankrupt.
While the formal development of this theory starts from Grossman and Hart (1982), who
formalize these conflicting interests and firstly identify the bonding role of firm’s debt, it is
Jensen (1986) who popularizes the last idea, giving a name to the cash flow available for
discretionary spending, the so-called free-cash-flow. Building on Jensen’s original insight, Stulz
(1990) tries to illustrate how committed payouts can reduce not only the over-investment
problem, but also the under-investment one. He sketches a setting in which a professional
manager derives personal benefits from expanding the size of a firm. To mitigate this agency
cost of managerial discretion, the shareholders, facing stochastic cash flows, choose the optimal
debt level to balance the costs of over-investment and the costs of under-investment.
More recently but on the same vein, Westphalen (2002) employs a continuous-time
contingent-claims approach to show that debt can reduce agency costs of free-cash-flow. The
optimal capital structure is then determined by the trade-off between the agency cost shield, i.e.
the benefits of reducing the cash flow subject to managerial discretion, and the implicit
bankruptcy costs arising from the loss of the agency cost shield.
Although theoretically important, at face value these analytical findings do not explain
simple stylized facts, in that firms are usually observed to carry both a relatively little debt and
huge amounts of cash reserves in their capital structures.
The first problem refers to the observation that, for example, the median corporate debt to
capital ratio in the U.S. averages only 30-35% over the last four decades, with two out of five
firms having an average debt to capital ratio of less than 20% (Strebulaev, 2007).
1 Morellec
1These estimates are based on COMPUSTAT data on the book value of debt and market value of equity. Otherwise,Alessandro Fiaschi
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(2004) tries to bridge the gap between agency theory and the "low leverage puzzle", and
develops a model of leverage choices where debt financing increases firm value by constraining
management’s choice of an investment policy. In his model, the manager has specific human
capital in administering the firm’s assets and thus is partially entrenched. But because of private
benefits she derives from investment, the manager tends to over-invest, thereby giving rise to
agency costs of free-cash-flow. The model shows that the impact of manager-stockholders
conflict on leverage decisions varies across firms and generally is significant, explaining both the
low debt levels observed in practice and the fact that high growth options firms tend to use less
debt.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that several empirical studies not only find evidence for the
so-called “low leverage puzzle”, but they also show huge amount of cash reserves in
corporations’ capital structure, which is the main reason of failure for the leverage to be an
effective bonding device in an optimal financing strategy (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007). All this evidence casts doubts on the reliability of the agency costs
literature. Intuitively, the free-cash-flow hypothesis fails to explain this evidence for either of
two reasons. One is that agency costs associated with the existence of free-cash-flow are not
sufficiently large to cover the additional costs of taking on debt. The second one is that
managerial discretion is ineffectively controlled when the amount of free cash is reduced through
debt payments. It is precisely this line of argument that motivates the theoretical part of this
contribution.
To address the inconsistency with the stylized facts, the first part of this paper develops a
simple optimal financing model which captures the basic ideas of Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)
to show that debt may help to reduce the agency costs of free-cash-flow. In so doing, it extends
Stulz’s (1990) model in order to include situations where the shareholders do not know the true
mean of the cash flow distribution over a longer-time horizon. Within this new framework, the
optimal debt level of a firm is chosen by the board of directors, conditional on an estimate of the
mean of the cash flow distribution. After observing a realization of the cash flow, one period
subsequent to the decision on debt, the manager updates her beliefs about the distribution of the
according to Parrino and Weisbach (1999), the typical U.S. firm on Compustat has about 24% long-term debt to
market value of total capital. See also Almeida et al. (2002) and Dittmar et al. (2003) for international comparison.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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cash flow. Since the mean of the cash flow is not known with certainty, the manager receives
additional information from this observation and can update her set of information to her
advantage. The new structure provides other mechanisms that can possibly account for the
inconsistency between the role of debt as discipline device in free-cash-flow agency models and
the empirical facts.
First, the derivation of the optimal financing choice captures the impact of expected cash
flow uncertainty on the role of debt financing in controlling under-investment and over-
investment costs due to potential managerial discretion behavior. As an equilibrium outcome, it
shows that an outside shareholder may decide to engage less in debt financing, seen as the
bonding device, due to the uncertainty of expected cash flows.
Second, the development of the model is able to capture some of the complexities of long-
term debt. The original analysis of Stulz (1990) rules out any significant role for long-term debt,
which is at odds with practical experience of modern corporations. With long-term debt, an
unexplored asymmetrical information problem exists, since the manager would have the
opportunity to observe cash flow realizations, prior to the debt payment, during the period when
the manager decides how to cover the debt payment that is looming in the future. Furthermore,
the model explores the role of manager’s risk aversion through a specified cash holding rule,
showing that the amount of optimal debt is inversely related to manager’s risk aversion.
Although previous papers have provided important insights on the issues I address in this
contribution, none has focused on the power of the debt discipline mechanism under expected
cash flow uncertainty. This model is rich enough, in terms of scope, and yet simple enough in
terms of modeling, to allow us to be quite specific about how changes in the firm’s informational
environment affect optimal financing choices. The success of limiting a manager’s actions
through restricting the amount of available free-cash-flow is dependent on the distributional
characteristics of the expected stream of future cash flow.
The differential effect of the informational context on firm’s optimal financing choices
allows us to derive a testable implication about how firms behave across different states. To wit,
my theory implies that, because leverage is supposed to be chosen optimally and expected cash
flow uncertainty decreases debt’s disciplining role, firms exhibiting a high variance of predictedAlessandro Fiaschi
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values of future cash show should be observed to carry less debt (and/or a shorter debt maturity)
in their capital structure. The effect of leverage on firm’s value is actually left as an open
question by the model and, of course, it lends itself to the empirical scrutiny.
Previous contributions to the managerial discretion agency literature has dealt with this
relationship in different ways. McConnell and Servaes (1995), among the first, empirically
investigate, on a large sample of US non-financial firms, the relation between corporate value
and a set of independent variables, such as leverage and other bonding mechanisms. Their
evidence supports the free-cash-flow contention that, for low-growth firms, leverage acts as a
monitoring mechanism to enhance firm value, but their analysis do not take into account the
endogeneity of financial structure.
This complexity becomes important if there are characteristics which affect both the firm’s
choice of capital structure and firm’s value.
2 Allowing for the existence of this endogeneity
problem, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) conduct cross-sectional regressions, over a sample of
large US firms, where Tobin’s Q is simultaneously determined with seven control mechanisms,
finding a lack of a relationship between leverage and firm value.
3 More recently, De Jong
(2002)
4 reformulate such approach by defining a model consisting of two equations, for leverage
and Tobin’s Q, explaining each other, and finding a negative significant correlation among these
variables.
Building on these premises and on the empirical implication of the theoretical model, an
econometric investigation on a panel of microeconomic data is developed in the second part of
the paper. Here, I examine the interplay between earnings uncertainty, leverage and firm’s value.
In particular, I try to pin down the exogenously driven variations of the firm’s financial structure
in order to avoid the endogeneity problems that would otherwise affect a regression of firm’s
performance on leverage. The approach followed here is related inter alia to Himmelberg et al.
(1999), who use panel data to study the link between managerial equity ownership, instead of
2A recent article by Larcker and Rusticus (2007), questioning about the relation between managerial equity
ownership and firm value, corroborates this point on view.
3Capital structure literature sometimes has also assumed Tobin’s Q to be simply an exogenous in a leverage
regression. For example, Smith and Watts (1992) document that industries with potentially the greatest agency costs
- those with fewer growth opportunities - have higher dividend yields, suggesting that payouts are used as a bonding
mechanism to control agency costs.
4Similarly, Ghosh (2007).Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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debt, and expected firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. They address the endogeneity
issue by instrumenting managerial equity ownership in their Q regression.
In the empirical analysis I use microeconomic panel data, which are drawn from two
different sources, for a sub-sample of non-financial FTSE (U.K.) firms from 1996 to 2005.
Annual balance sheet and income statement data are taken from the Osiris Database held by
Bureau van Dijk. I also make use of data on forecasts of future profits for each individual
company, issued each month by professional securities analysts, and released by Institutional
Brokers Estimate System, a service by Thompson Financial. These data allow me to construct an
indicator of the level of expected profits uncertainty facing a particular firm in a given period,
based on the disagreement or dispersion in the profits’ forecasts issued by different analysts for
that firm at that time.
The regression results lend empirical support for the model’s theoretical prediction, showing
a negative and statistically significant effect of forecasts uncertainty on firm’s leverage.
However, the baseline regression outcome documents also that firms with lower leverage have a
higher level of performance, a result which casts some doubts on the ex-post effectiveness of
debt as a value-enhancing discipline device against agency problems.
In the last part of the paper, I further investigate this issue to discover whether negative
relationship between leverage and Q is driven by firms’ heterogeneity in growth opportunities
and agency characteristics. To this purpose, I estimate a censored normal regression model
where the dependent variable is a measure of potential agency costs, proxied by an indicator of
low growth opportunities multiplied by balance sheet’s free cash flow (as in Doukas et al., 2000;
Doukas et al., 2005) and endogenous leverage is one of the regressors. The new results are
consistent with the agency costs literature, since the censored model lends empirical support to
the view that the level of debt plays a positive effect in reducing the potential non-value-
maximizing conduct of managers. At the same time, the negative coefficient of cash flow
uncertainty in the first stage’s leverage equation remains statistically significant, consistent with
the theoretical prediction of the theoretical framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is developed in Section
2. The shareholders optimal debt choice and comparative statics on the optimal debt level areAlessandro Fiaschi
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reported in Section 3. The effects of uncertainty of the mean of the cash flow in reported in
Section 4. A discussion of the implications of prior belief follows in Section 5. Section 6
summarizes the empirical implications of the model. Section 7 describes and discuss the
empirical methods and the testing strategy, while section 8 presents the main findings. Section 9
concludes the paper. Appendix collects all the proofs.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
The level of debt F is
chosen by the board
First cash flow realization
(from assets in place) R1 is
observed.
The manager updates her
belief about the mean of
the cash flow distribution.
According to a cash rule,
the manager invests all the
cash flow net of the cash
held for debt payment (at
time t = 3)
Second cash flow
realization (from assets in
place) R2 is observed.
All debt is paid back
Investment pays off.
The firm is liquidated
2 The model
Consider the following model, whose baseline version was firstly laid out by Stulz (1990).
Assume that capital markets are complete with no transaction costs. A firm, consisting of assets
in place and investment opportunities, exists at four given dates: 0, 1, 2, 3. The firm’s assets in
place at date 0 yield, at dates 1 and 2, a non-negative cash flow, which is assumed to be
randomly distributed, that a manager can either invest in new projects or pay out. The firm has
also investment opportunities at date 1 that managers and shareholders want to exploit, but at
date 0 it does not. The available investment opportunities are assumed to fall into two ranges:
value increasing (good) investments and value decreasing (bad) investments.
5 At date 0, the
board of directors choose a debt level as in Stulz (1990), based on expectations of future cash
flow. In the second one, a realization of cash flow is observed; the manager updates her beliefs
about the cash flow distribution, and invests all the cash flow net of the cash held for debt
5Recently, such specification for the investment function is also assumed by Morellec (2004) and by Morellec and
Smith (2007).Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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payment. In the third period, a second realization of cash flow is observed, and the debt payment
is made. Finally in the fourth period, the returns from investment are realized. The time line of
the firm is depicted above.
Although manager-shareholder conflicts may take different forms, I introduce this agency
problem by presuming that the manager receives private benefits from any investment. As in
Stulz (1990), a stringent assumption is considered, in that it always is optimal for the manager to
invest. Agency costs of managerial discretion typically depend on the allocation of control rights
within the firm. Consistent with previous literature,
6 we may assume shareholders as represented
by a stockholder-elected board that acts in their best interest, by choosing a capital structure
which maximizes shareholder value. From a contract-theoretic perspective, bankruptcy laws
ensure that management can credibly pledge to honor the debt contract decided by the board.
However, the board cannot dictate investment policy because investment decisions, although
observable, are not verifiable and, thus, are not contractible.
7
The board of directors maximizes firm value by choosing a debt level in period one. It
knows the distribution of the cash flow R , which is a random variable taken from a normal
distribution with mean  and variance
2  , which is assumed known. After the manager
observes the cash flow realization R , she updates her belief about the mean of the cash flow
realization. To this end, I now introduce an assumption which implies this decision process. I
employ a simple Bayesian updating approach previously suggested, inter alia, by Holmström
(1999) in the context of his "career concerns" model.
8 The manager shares the prior belief about
the cash flow with the shareholders, and we assume that her prior is normally distributed with
mean m and variance
2  .
9 Since a posterior constructed from a normal prior and a normal
6For example, Westphalen (2002) or Morellec and Smith (2002).
7Anyway, in what follows, I use the terms shareholders and board as synonyms.
8While other Bayesian updating representations could ostensibly be used, the normal conjugate importantly allows
for tractable results.
9The normal distribution is a reasonable choice for the prior distribution of the mean, for several reasons. First of all,
the normal distribution is quite flexible, since the prior mean can take any value along the real line, while the prior
variance can be chosen so that our prior beliefs are influential determinants of the posterior mean and variance.
Besides, the normal distribution may be a close representation of our prior beliefs, if our prior beliefs are symmetric
and uni-modal about some point along the real line. Finally, it is conjugate, so the posterior will be normal. Bayes’
theorem moves from one member of the conjugate family to another member. Because of this, we don’t need to
perform the integration in order to evaluate the posterior.Alessandro Fiaschi
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stochastic variable is also normal, a simple updating rule exists for the posterior belief of the
mean of the cash flow (Bolstad, 2007).
Assumption 1 Let the learning process of the manager satisfy:
2
2 2 ( ) m R R m

 




, is the manager updated belief about the expected value of the cash flow,
after observing a realization of the cash flow variable. Obviously, if the observed cash flow is
greater (less) than the estimated mean, m, the mean of the posterior, m
, increases (decreases).
The manager bases her investment decision on the updated belief of cash flow.
Following Stulz (1990), the manager has infinite investment opportunities to pursue. Let the
first I
 investment be value-increasing (good) projects and any investment beyond I
 be value
decreasing (bad) projects.
10 Furthermore, I assign rates of return to the good and bad investments
to be G p and B p , respectfully. The rate of return of the good investments, G p , is greater than
zero, while the rate of return from bad investments, B p , is less than zero.
The debt payment is made at date three and the returns from the investment are realized at
date four, so the manager must hold some cash in the second period to repay the debt and avoid
possible default. Within the literature, the manager is modeled to either expand all cash flow to
fund all available investment projects regardless of expected return (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990;
Hart and Moore, 1995) or abscond with all cash flow outright (Fluck, 1996, Hart and Moore,
1998). In this model the manager is less opportunistic, because here she is assumed to face some
costs of bankruptcy and, therefore, holds cash for the future debt payment. The problem is to
model the manager’s action as a simple rule justified by the evidence. In the recent literature on
ownership and control is commonly assumed that managers are risk-averse.
11 The main reason
why self-interested managers are assumed to be risk-averse is the fear of bankruptcy. It is even
argued that managers have a tendency to be more risk averse than shareholders, because outside
10The exact form of the manager’s utility function is not an issue here. However, it seems reasonable to assume a
decreasing marginal utility of consuming perquisites and over-investing. For tractability reasons, I assume, as in
Stulz (1990), Vogt (1994) and Morellec (2004), a manager whose utility is linear in the currency amount of
investment. This specification allows us to capture Jensen’s idea that the overinvestment problem is more severe for
firms that generate large cash flows.
11For an overview, see Grinblatt and Titman (2002).Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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shareholders can avoid unsystematic risk by means of diversification. On the empirical side,
Opler et al. (1999) concludes that a significant amount of cash holding within the corporate
structure is attributable to manager’s risk aversion.
Consistent with this literature, I hypothesize that the representative manager acts to shield
himself from an imprecise prior, according to a cash holding function which I assume to depend
upon the updated belief of the mean cash flow.
Assumption 2 Let the cash holding rule of the manager satisfy:
1 2 F m  
  
where F is the amount of debt due in next period, m
 is the updated belief of the mean of the
cash flow, 1  and 2  are the cash holding rule parameters that capture the relevant characteristics
of the manager and any bankruptcy costs borne by the manager. This characterization
acknowledges the possibility of reputational and other costs, here expressed by two parameters
included in the rule. First, a parameter, 1  ( 1 0 1    ), measuring the manager’s risk aversion
and any bankruptcy costs due unprofitable empire-building investments. Second, a measure of
the effects of the precision of the prior estimate of the mean of the cash flow distribution, 2  , is
included. If 1 1   and 2 0   , the manager holds the amount of the debt payment minus the
expected value of the next period’s cash flow. As the reputational costs of bankruptcy increase
and/or the manager’s aversion to risk increases, 1  decreases, so that the manager holds more
cash for the repayment of the debt. As to the other parameter, it is worth to note that 2  is an
increasing function of
2  . In this construction, 2  captures the relationship of reputational and
other costs to the precision of the prior. If 2 0   , there are no additional costs borne out by the
manager with respect to the prior, while if it increases, it lets the cash holding rule capture the
manager’s desire to shield himself from an imprecise prior. This development of the cash
holding rule is therefore consistent with the recent empirical studies on corporate cash holdings
cited above.
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Here, ( ) V F m  is the value of the firm. The cash flow from assets in place, R i, is a
nonnegative stochastic variable with a cumulative distribution function ( ) i G R and differentiable
density ( ) i g R which is strictly positive for all 0 i R  (i =1,2). F , the firm’s negative net
financing, is the choice variable, and m is the prior estimate of the mean of the cash flow
distribution. The posterior of the estimated mean of the cash flow distribution, m
, is as defined
in Assumption 1.
Without managerial discretion, the value of the firm would be the expected value of the cash
flow realizations and the return from the optimal level of investment, assuming the cash flow is
large enough to finance the optimal investment level. The first three expressions, in the above
value function, represent the value of the firm without sub-optimal investment. The last two
expressions are the costs of managerial discretion. The second to last expression is the expected
cost associated with under-investment. If the first realization of cash flow is less than the cash
holding rule plus the optimal level of debt, some of the positive NPV investments are forgone.
The value of the firm is reduced by the return lost by not pursuing the optimal level of
investment. The last expression is the expected cost associated with over-investment. If the first
realization of cash flow is greater than the sum of the optimal investment level and the cash
holding rule, the residual cash flow is invested in value-decreasing investments. The value of the
firm is reduced by the losses generated by these bad projects.
Furthermore, it must be noted that I assume that the manager cannot raise additional
financing in the second period. If the cash in the second period is less than the cash holding rule,
the manager is assumed to liquidate the firm at a value of 2 ( ) E R . The assumption of the
liquidation value of the firm is made for notational ease and does not change the results of the
model. Investments are assumed to be specific to the assets in place and the current manager.
The interest rate is assumed to be zero for analytical simplicity.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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3 Optimal debt level
This section shows that a solution to the simple stakeholder optimization problem exists and
analyzes the relevant comparative statics at the optimal debt level. The board of directors
chooses the optimal level of debt to constraint the manager from financing value-decreasing
projects, at the potential cost of the manager investing less than the optimal level of investment.
The board knows the optimal level of investment, the manager’s cash holding rule parameters,
the estimated mean of the cash flow distribution, the precision of the estimate and the true
variance of the cash flow distribution.
Proposition 1. If the value of the firm increases by issuing a positive amount of debt in the
neighborhood of 1 2 F m     , then a single finite optimal debt level exists.
Proof. See Appendix 2
The existence and sign of the first and second derivative of the value function guarantee the
existence of an optimum. The second derivative is negative for all non-negative values of F
under the restriction of 1 2 F m     . This restriction prevents the manager from holding more
cash in the first period than the firm owes in the third period. The manager would not do
otherwise, since her incentives are tied to investing all possible cash flows.
The board chooses the optimal debt level to balance the costs associated with under-
investment and over-investment, given the estimated mean of the cash flow. Not surprisingly, the
solution equates these marginal costs:
1 2












       (2)
The right hand side of the above equation is the marginal cost of over-investment and the
left hand side is the marginal cost of under-investment. For the firm to issue debt at all, the
marginal cost of over-investment has to exceed marginal cost of under-investment when F=0.
The debt level that satisfies this condition is the optimal debt level, given the estimated mean of
the cash flow distribution.
Proposition 2. The optimal level of debt, F
 is: (i) decreasing in the return from the good
investment, G p , and increasing in the return from bad investment, B p ; (ii) decreasing in the
optimal level of investment, I
; (iii) increasing in the estimated mean of the cash flow, m; (iv)Alessandro Fiaschi
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increasing in the cash holding parameters, 1  and 2  .
Proof. See Appendix 3
The results are intuitively straightforward and (i) and (ii) are consistent with those of Stulz’
(1990) seminal model. If the rate of return on good investment increases, the marginal cost of
under-investment increases. In other words, the shareholders are more concerned with possible
under-investment than before and the level of debt should be decreased to compensate for the
increase in the rate of return on good investment. Similarly, if the rate of return on the bad
investment increases, the marginal cost of over-investment decreases. The stockholders are less
concerned about over-investment and the optimal level of debt decreases.
If the firm’s optimal level of investment increases, the cost associated with under-investment
increases and the costs associated with over-investment decreases. The optimal debt level
decreases. In this manner, the manager has more cash flow to pursue the additional value-
increasing investments.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of the proposition analyze the effects of the manager’s cash holding rule.
These are new findings of this model. The manager is assumed to hold a scalar multiple of the
estimated mean of the cash flow to repay the long-term debt in the third period. An increase in
the scalar increases the amount of cash the manager will hold for this repayment and decreases
the amount available to finance investment. This increases the marginal cost of under-investment
and decreases the marginal cost of over-investment. Thus, the optimal debt level decreases with
the increase in the manager’s cash holding parameter. For example, a more risk-averse manager
could be characterized to have a larger cash holding parameter, 1  . The board knows the
manager is more risk-averse and can reduce the optimal level of debt accordingly.
The cash holding precision parameter, 2  , captures the effects of the uncertainty
surrounding the cash flow distribution. This parameter is included to capture the effects of the
precision on the reputational and bankruptcy costs borne by the manager. If she is risk-averse,
the cash holding precision parameter will be greater than zero. The manager will hold additional
cash for the repayment of debt and, thus, the shareholders can reduce the amount of debt used to
prevent over-investment.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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The estimate of the mean of the cash flows affects the optimal level of debt in a way similar
to the effect of the cash holding scalar. The optimal level of debt is increasing in the estimated
mean.
4 Effect of the uncertain mean
The effects of the uncertain mean are dependent upon the value of the realization of the cash
flow the manager observes. I divide the analysis into two cases.
4.1 Over-investment
In the first case, the manager observes a high cash flow state and updates her beliefs. The
observed cash flow is greater than the estimate; thus the updated estimate of the cash flow mean
is greater than the prior estimate. Since the manager believes the prospects of the ongoing
concern are better than expected, she reserves less cash for the repayment of the debt. This
reduction in the amount of cash held increases the size of the investment made by the manager.
Proposition 3. If the observed realization of cash flow is greater than the estimated mean of this
variable, the manager finances more investment than expected by the stakeholders, i.e.
managerial discretion increases.
Proof. See Appendix 4
The manager updates her beliefs after observing a realization of the cash flow. Her updated
estimate of the mean is greater than her prior and, therefore, the manager invests beyond the
level intended by the board. If the manager could not update her beliefs, or invest based on those
beliefs, she would invest less.
4.2 Under-investment
Similarly, in the second case, the manager observes a low cash flow state and updates her beliefs.
Since the updated estimation of the mean is less than the previous estimate, she under-invests.
Proposition 4. If the observed realization of cash flow is less than the estimated mean of this
variable, the manager finances less investment than expected by the stakeholders, i.e.
managerial discretion increases.
Proof. See Appendix 5Alessandro Fiaschi
Author
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This case is similar to the above case. If the manager could not update her beliefs, or invest
based on those beliefs, she would invest more and the managerial discretion increases beyond the
level established by earlier literature.
5 Discussion of the prior belief
We have shown that the level of managerial discretion within a firm can change with the
informational content of the cash flow realizations. When the manager observes a value of cash
flow different from the estimated mean, she updates her belief about the mean of the cash flow
distribution, thus leading to under- or over-investments. The remaining question to be explored is
the effect of the precision of the estimate of the mean of the cash flow. The precision of the
estimate of this variable determinates the informational content of the first realization of the cash
flow.
Proposition 5. The magnitude of the increase in costs from managerial discretion increases in
the variance of the stakeholders estimated mean of the cash flow distribution.
Proof. See Appendix 6
Let
UNDER OVER I
 be the managerial discretion agency cost (under-investment or over-
investment) and
2  the variance of the estimate of the mean of the cash flow distribution, the
proposition above set an increasing relationship between the two terms. In other words,
2 0




holds. The precision of the estimate affects the outcome of the model in two ways. First a more
precise estimate of the cash flow allows the stakeholders to better control the manager’s action
by choosing the optimal debt level. Second, the informational content of the estimate, as a result
of the precision of the estimate, determines the extent to which the manager updates her beliefs
after observing the cash flow.
6 Empirical implication
The theory’s key empirical implication concerns how firms should choose their capital structure
according to the effect of the information environment on the agency cost of free cash flow. AsManagerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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emphasized above, the ability of debt to restrict a manager’s value decreasing actions is reduced
if the distribution of the cash flow is not known with certainty. In the model, uncertainty is
introduced in the form of an unknown mean of the cash flow distribution. When the observed
cash flow is greater than the shareholder’s estimate of the mean, the manager finances value-
decreasing investments beyond the level he would choose under certainty. Otherwise, when the
observed cash flow is less than the shareholders’ estimate of the mean, the manager under-
invests and some NPV projects are not pursued. The magnitude of both of these value-reducing
actions by the manager decreases with the precision of the shareholders’ estimate of the mean of
the cash flow. The related empirical implication derives directly from Proposition 5:
Implication The ability of debt to restrict managerial discretion is dependent upon the precision
of the estimate of the cash flow distribution, so firms with high variance between different
financial analysts’ predicted value of future cash flow (or earnings), should be observed to carry
less debt in their capital structures.
The crux of the model is that the optimal debt level is chosen without perfect information
about the cash flow distribution. Prior research has skirted around the fact that characteristics of
the cash flow determine those of the instruments used to finance the firm. The theoretical
contribution has shown, within a simple agency cost model, that not only the characteristics of
the cash flow distribution are important, but the certainty of the knowledge surrounding the cash
flow distribution as well as the informational content of individual cash flow realizations is
significant.
7 Empirical tests
This section focuses on the empirical strategy, in order to test the implications of my theoretical
model. The main implication of the model developed in previous sections is that if leverage plays
some disciplining role on potential managerial discretion costs, consistently with the agency cost
theory, then it should be negatively correlated to the dispersion of earnings forecasts. Leverage
level, in turn, should have a value enhancing effect on firm’s performance. In order to implement
a test to this argument, I need to specify an empirical model relating firm’s performance to
leverage and showing how the interplay of earnings forecasts uncertainty and financing choices
impinges upon firm valuation. I will tackle this issue shortly. Since the following empiricalAlessandro Fiaschi
Author
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analysis is going to make use of earnings’ forecasts dispersion as a measure of uncertainty, I
presents a preliminary discussion of this connection. Then, I describe the firm-level data used in
my tests and the empirical model.
7.1 The relationship between forecast disagreement and earnings uncertainty
The question of how to evaluate evidence and assess confidence has been investigated
experimentally by psychologists and decision researchers. To use an analogy from the
psychology literature, consensus forecasts can be understood as a letter of recommendation for a
stock. In their seminal paper on the weighing of evidence and formation of beliefs in human
thought, Griffin and Tversky (1992) use the example of a letter of recommendation for a
graduate student written by a former teacher to illustrate how people form beliefs. They point out
that one should consider two separate aspects: how positive it is and how credible or
knowledgeable the writer. In the context of earnings forecasts, it is possible to distinguish
between the strength of a recommendation, which is equivalent to the upward or downward
changes in earnings expectations, and of its weight or validity, which is represented by the
dispersion in forecasts.
The first point to note is that what is not being measured by disagreement is a subjective
assessment of earnings uncertainty. That is, we have no data on how confident any of the
forecasters is about his/her point estimate. In theory, a group of forecasters could all agree about
the mean of the distribution while each being hugely uncertain. Conversely, they could all place
enormous confidence in their own estimates while differing from each other. Despite this
possibility, it is common practice throughout the social sciences to view the variation across a
survey of respondents’ assessments of an unknown quantity as a proxy for the true uncertainty in
their environment. Intuitively, an observer of the survey with no other information about the
quantity, or about the respondents, might well view each estimate as being as good as the next,
and so treat them as separate noisy signals of the true value. In aggregating this information, the
observer would then construct a posterior distribution whose variance would be directly
proportional to the variance across signals.
This interpretation raises some concern anyhow. First of all, there is no consensus
explanation for analysts’ behavior in the burgeoning literature about the properties of earningsManagerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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expectations.
12 Besides, it is still not clear if and how much the level of dispersion and the
forecast itself may be a function of some incentives or distortions.
13 Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that Keane and Runkle (1998) find no evidence that analysts profit forecasts deviate from
rational expectations. Besides, since the focus of this paper is about the effect of differences in
dispersion across stocks on firm leverage, issues of bias or incentives matter less.
There is empirical support for viewing disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty surrounding
the expected value of a variable. In a review of the literature concerning forecasts of earnings by
analysts in the U.S., Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) argue that the level in earnings forecasts is
perceived by investors as valuable information about the level of uncertainty concerning firms’
future economic performance, but the evidence reported in the first empirical research is mixed
and difficult to interpret, because the tests are based on (summary) dispersion measures heavily
influenced by old and outdated forecasts.
14 The development of standardized methods and
processes for collecting and using these data has however evolved rapidly over the last two
decades. Barron et al. (1998) and Barron and Stuerke (1998), by using a detailed analyst earnings
forecast dataset to estimate dispersion and revision proxies, provide strong evidence consistent
with arguments that dispersions in earnings forecasts can be used by market participants as an
indicator of uncertainty about firms’ future economic performance. More recently, Bond and
Cummins (2004) and Bond et al. (2004), consider some indicators based on summary analysts’
forecasts to investigate the empirical relationship between company investment and uncertainty
about expected future profitability. A number of other studies have also related disagreement
among inflation forecasts to uncertainty about inflation. For example, Mankiw et al. (2003) have
argued that disagreement about expected inflation may be a key to better understanding
macroeconomic dynamics. However, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) caution that disagreement
and uncertainty are distinct concepts, even though they turn out to be positively correlated in
their sample of professional inflation forecasters. Bomberger (1996, 1999) compares the
12A survey is provided by Kothari (2001).
13For example, Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that managers can abuse accounting discretion to expand or maintain
private control rights and to prevent outside monitoring. Bernhardt and Campello (2007) show that successfully
managing analyst forecasts is a primary determinant of weather a firm generates a positive earnings surprise. On the
other hand, there is empirical evidence (e.g., Bhat et al., 2006) of a positive association between proxies of
governance transparency and forecast accuracy, in countries that mandate extensive disclosure (such as the U.S. and
the U.K.).
14For example, Daley et al. (1988) and Stickel (1989).Alessandro Fiaschi
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dispersion of inflation forecasts from the Livingston survey to subsequent realized variance of
forecast errors and also finds a strong positive relationship.
Therefore, caution is warranted in extrapolating to the current setting. Yet, these findings
suggest that the link between the divergence of opinion among analysts and uncertainty of the
underlying earnings rests on solid ground. The following analysis will build on that foundation,
taking that nexus as a maintained hypothesis.
7.2 Sample selection criteria
I use firm-level accounting and share-price data for UK-quoted companies over the period 1996-
2005 with data available from the Osiris database, provided by Bureau van Dijk.
15 Then, I merge
balance sheet data with analysts’ earnings forecasts, obtained from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, a service of Thomson Financial, which covers a sub-sample
of UK-quoted companies from 1987 onwards.
16
To build the panel, I started with an initial sample of 308 companies taken from Osiris.
Firms under the direct or indirect control of the government, banks, insurance companies and
other financial companies and firms with non reported industry code are set aside from the
sample. To ensure the reliability of the data, I exclude firms which are reporting non credible
values such as negative debt and negative total assets. To ensure that outliers do not drive the
results, the extreme low and high 1% of each variable are winsorized. I avoid exacerbating the
sample by not requiring a balanced panel (Baltagi, 2001).
Data on analysts’ profits forecasts are kindly made available by I/B/E/S International Inc.
I/B/E/S reports forecasts only from analysts who meet a set of criteria designed to ensure that
they are well informed about the business situation of individual companies. The forecasts we
use were issued early in the current-year accounting period, and comprise forecasts of earnings
15Osiris is a comprehensive database of listed companies, banks and insurance companies around the world. In
addition to the income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and ratios, this database contains (where
available) news, ownership, subsidiaries, ratings, earnings estimates and stock data to make it a well-established
source of global listed companies’ information. Bureau Van Dijk also provides its products to Universities and
Business schools, which use the databases for research information.
16I/B/E/S data are available for over 45 countries and over 12,000 companies. I/B/E/S International Inc. created its
Academic Research Program over 30 years ago to provide both summary and individual analyst forecasts of
company earnings, cash flows, and other important financial items, as well as buy-sell-hold recommendations.
I/B/E/S is available electronically through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), a database centre maintained
by the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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per share for the current year and for the following year. I/B/E/S reports the (unweighted) mean
of the analysts forecasts issued for a particular firm, known as the consensus forecast, as well as
the standard deviation across these individual forecasts. I make use of both the mean and the
standard deviation in our measures of expected uncertainty, since it is a mean of coefficients of
variations during the accounting year. The measure of earnings corresponds to that agreed on by
the majority of analysts tracking a particular firm. In broad terms, this definition corresponds to a
measure of net profits after interest and taxes, and it removes a larger set of non-recurrent items
than extraordinary items reported in published accounts. In addition to the availability of
accounting and stock market data, I require that firms were tracked by at least two securities
analysts in the mean of the year. This requirement likely introduces a sample selection bias,
although to the extent that selection into the set of firms tracked by multiple analysts is
determined by time-invariant characteristics, this should be controlled for by the inclusion of
firm-specific fixed effects in the econometric specifications.
17 The final sample forms an




In this section, I first introduce a model specification that captures the argument I propose. I
subsequently describe the implementation of empirical proxies for the variables considered.
7.3.1 The model
My empirical analysis is based on the following estimation framework. First, I identify
exogenous variations in firms’ financial structure induced by factors that do not directly affect
firm value. Second, I investigate whether the exogenous variations in leverage induce firms to
change their performance. The reason for considering exogenously driven variations of the
firm’s financial structure is that a straight regression of firm’s performance measure on leverage
would be subject to serious endogeneity problems. Causality may run in both directions.
19 At the
same time, the theoretical model in the previous section, predicts that disagreement across future
earnings forecasts may negatively affect leverage. I test the empirical validity of such a
17Clearly, the condition would have been stronger if it was imposed month-by-month.
18A list of U.K. companies included in the sample is available upon request.
19On this point, see, e.g., Nucci et al. (2005).Alessandro Fiaschi
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relationship and weather the interplay with leverage affect only indirectly firm value. I adopt the
following instrumental variable specification:
it q q it it q i it
it lev it lev it lev i it
Q Lev u
Lev w
   
   
                
X
Z X
where Q it is the measure of performance of firm i at time t and Lev it is the leverage of firm i at
time t. The leverage regression is the first stage equation, X it and Z it denote vectors of
observable exogenous variables, i  and i  reflects the fixed latent heterogeneity and it u and it w
are random error terms, assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
mean zero and variance
2
j  ( j u  or w). The coefficient’s vectors are denoted with the initial
of the dependent variable they belong to, and I estimate the above equation using the fixed effect
instrumental-variable estimator, which accounts for within-firm variations in the dependent
variable.
7.3.2 Implementing empirical proxies
In this section, I describe the variables used in the empirical specification (see also Table 1
below).
Tobin’s Q. Following a common practice in the agency literature,
20 the explanatory variable
to measure firm performance is the Tobin’s Q-ratio.
21 Hermalin and Weisbach (1991: 104) state
that in the absence of market power, “a divergence of Q from one represents the value of the
assets not included in the denominator of Q, such as the value of the internal organization or the
value of expected agency costs. A Q above one indicates that the market views the firm’s
internal organization as exceptionally good or the expected agency costs as particularly small.” It
is not trivial to note that the way we are using Q here is not the same as in the investment
literature, where it is interpreted as measuring the marginal increment to profitability from the
investment decision. Here Q merely captures the effectiveness with which given managers
operate their capital stock, so it is mainly a measure of performance. There remain of course
20For example: Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach, (1988; 1991), McConnell and Servaes (1990),
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Short and Keasy (1999). Interestingly, all of these studies empirically investigate
what is the relationship between managerial ownership, voting control or other governance mechanism, and firm
performance, measure by Tobin’s Q.
21It might, in fairness, be called ‘Tobin and Brainard’s q’ since the concept now known as Tobin’s q was first
introduced (and discussed at length) in Brainard and Tobin (1968).Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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substantial difficulties in accurately measuring Q, for instance we observe the book value of the
company, rather than the replacement cost of the assets which is probably the more relevant
measure. Because of the impracticality of calculating the theoretical Q, as estimated by
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lang and Litzenberger (1989), this work uses a simplified
version of Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the ratio of market value of total assets to the book
value of asset. The market value of total assets is defined as: book value of asset less book value
of equity (BE) plus market value of equity (MCAP). BE is calculated following Fama and French
(1997) as stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes.
22
Leverage. Following Datta et al. (2005) and Aggarwal and Zhao (2007), leverage is defined
in market terms, that is, as the ratio of total debt to the market value of total assets. There is no
clear consensus in the empirical literature on whether firm’s leverage should be measured in
book or market terms. On the one hand, Barclay et al. (2003) point out that book leverage is
theoretically preferable in regressions of financial leverage, arguing that using market values in
the denominator might spuriously correlate with explanatory variables, such as Tobin’s Q. On
the other, Welch (2004) strongly argues against book leverage in favor of market leverage since,
in his words, "the book value of equity is primarily a “plug number” to balance the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of the balance sheet - and it can even be negative." (Welch 2004: 125). In
light of this controversy, as a robustness check, I also rerun my regressions using some
alternative measures of book leverage, but all the results (not reported, to save space) are quite
robust to changes in the definition of leverage ratio.
23
Other variables. In order to instrument leverage, this study selects the following variables (
it Z ): a) Tangibility, measured as the ratio of net Property Plant and Equipment (Net PPE) to
Total Assets.; b) Earnings forecasts dispersion.
22Due to data availability limitations, we not include the last part of Fama and French’s (2002) calculation of BE,
namely: investment tax credit and postretirement benefit liabilities, minus the book value of preferred stocks order
of the redemption, liquidation. All of these, however, are suggested by the authors according to their availability.
23In principle, book and market leverage may also move in opposite directions. This intuition is supported by several
studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1992; Gomes and Schmid, 2007), who document different cyclicality properties of
book and market leverage ratios: whereas market leverage moves strongly counter-cyclically, book leverage is
strongly pro-cyclical (Covas and Den Haan, 2006).Alessandro Fiaschi
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The first instrument, Tangibility, is a definition of collateral assets (e.g., Baker and Wurgler,
2002) and has a long tradition of explanatory variable in leverage equations.
24 Previous empirical
studies
25 argue that this or similar measures of collateral assets (e.g. the ratio of fixed assets over
total assets) are an important determinant of leverage. However, the direction of influence is not
ex ante clear. On the one hand, alleviating the classical bondholder-shareholder conflict (e.g.,
Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) with more tangible assets, the creditors
have an improved guarantee of repayment. Moreover, tangibility increases the value of assets in
case of bankruptcy.
26 Even in the worst state, firm assets retain more value in liquidation.
Accordingly, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between measures of leverage
and the proportion of tangible assets. On the other hand, managers of highly levered firms will be
less able to consume excessive perquisites, since bondholders more closely monitor such firms
(Grossman and Hart, 1982).
The other chosen instrument, in the debt equation, is represented by Earnings forecast
uncertainty, measured by the Dispersion in earnings forecasts, which will be illustrated in the
subsection below. From a theoretical point of view, the theoretical model shows a way this
variable can affect the choice of the debt level. In that setting, optimal capital structure is
determined by trading off benefits of managerial access to funds for good investment
opportunities with costs of access to bad ones. Since magnitude of the costs from managerial
discretion is shown to be an increasing function of the precision of the stockholders’ forecasts, a
low dispersion in the expected cash flow (here proxied by expected earnings) would allow them
to better control the manager’s action by choosing the optimal debt level. As a consequence, I
predict a negative relationship between forecasts’ uncertainty and leverage. Instrument validity
requires that the first variable do not explain Q.
24Campello (2007) empirically examines the role of asset tangibility in influencing firm performance under external
financing. Toward this end, he explicitly considers the potential for endogeneity in tests involving asset tangibility.
His strategy builds on the notion that managers’ incentives to adopt performance-enhancing policies under external
financing grows with the tangibility of their firms’ assets after financing takes place. Although my empirical
strategy, as prior research studies, considers tangibility only as an exogenous characteristic in the leverage equation,
the two stage model I present, also recognizes a "moral hazard problem" of firm performance under external
financing, but it attempts to understand this interplay under expected earnings uncertainty.
25For example, Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Fama and French (2002).
26As Booth et al. (2001, p. 101) state: "The more tangible the firm’s assets, the greater its ability to issue secured
debt".Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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Although some empirical evidence shows that the dispersion effect may be a manifestation
of financial distress
27 (Avramov et al., 2008), therefore justifying a negative correlation between
analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and leverage along the traditional lines, it is not trivial to
note that corporations selected for coverage by analysts are likely to be relatively profitable firms
in industries of interest to I/B/E/S customers. Carpenter and Guariglia (2006), commenting a
passage of a paper by Cummins et al. (2006),
28 signal that firms facing constraints are less likely
to be followed by I/B/E/S analysts. It seems reasonable to suppose that the empirical sample used
in the present research is biased towards financially healthy firms, which would not normally be
the focus of a study on the potential for financing constraints to affect performance.
As for the exogenous variables ( it X ) that determine both Q and leverage, this study
includes: a) Profitability, measured the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation
and Amortization (EBITDA) to Total Assets; b) Size, measured by the natural logarithm of Total
Assets in 1996 million pounds.
Profitability is considered to explain the past and potential future performance of a firm.
This idea is traditionally consistent with sales accelerator models: higher levels of sales enhance
the production capacity in order to meet an enlarged demand (Fazzari et al., 1988). So, firm’s
market value, whatever measured, should be related to profitability of the firm as well as current
profits. However profitability may be due to factors other than profitable growth opportunities
(e.g. market power). To the extent that realized profitability is positively correlated with
profitable growth opportunities and with managerial ability, this is consistent with the agency
approach. Nonetheless, it is also consistent with Myers’ pecking order hypothesis, which states
that more profitable firms have more internal financing available and, therefore, rely less on
external financing, including debt. By contrast, there are no consistent theoretical predictions on
the effect of profitability on leverage, especially on market leverage,
29 even if it is often included
as explanatory variable. From the point of view of the trade-off theory, more profitable
companies should have higher leverage, because they have more income to shield from taxes.
27As proxied, e.g., by credit risk.
28In an earlier version of their paper, Cummins et al. (1997) state: “Our results suggest that the constrained group
excludes firms covered by securities analysts, consistent with theories based on asymmetric information.” (1997: 28)
29When leverage is measured in book terms, accounting rules imply that the book value of equity increases with
historical cash flows and decreases with asset depreciation. So, not surprisingly, profitability and fixed assets are the
important predictors of book value based debt ratios (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).Alessandro Fiaschi
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The free-cash-flow theory would suggest that more profitable companies should use more debt in
order to discipline managers, to induce them to pay out cash instead of spending money on
inefficient projects. On the other hand, from the point of view of the pecking order theory, firms
prefer internal financing to external one. So, more profitable companies have a lower need for
external financing and, therefore, should have lower leverage.
As to the last common explanatory variable, company Size, it can be correlated in many
ways with firm value (Moeller et al., 2005; Connolly and Hirschey, 2005). For example, large
firms may have greater agency problems, because it is harder to monitor them or because of the
free-cash-flow argument à la Jensen (1986). Alternatively, small firms may have better growth
opportunities and, as implied by the argument above, greater need for external finance and better
governance mechanisms. For these reasons, we believe to use size not just in the leverage
equation but also as a variable in the Q-regression. From the theoretical point of view, the effect
of size on leverage is ambiguous, too. There may be several competing effects. Larger firms tend
to be more diversified, exhibiting more stable cash flow. They also tend to fail less often, so size
may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, size should have a positive
impact on the supply debt. On the other hand, some papers, e.g. Fama and Jensen (1983), point
out that larger firms provide more information. This lowers information asymmetry, increasing
the attraction of equity for investors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Table 1 Accounting variable descriptions
Q Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of market value of total assets to the book value of asset. The market value of
total assets is defined as: book value of asset - book value of equity (BE) + market value of equity (MCAP). BE
is calculated following Fama and French (1997) as stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (if available). MCAP is defined as stock price times the number of shares outstanding at the
end of the fiscal year.
Lev Market Leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to market value of total assets.
Size The natural logarithm of total assets, in 1996 million pounds.
Tang Tangibility, defined as the ratio of net property plant and equipment (net PPE) to total assets.
Profit Profitability, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to
total assets.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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7.3.3 Uncertainty measure
The particular measure of dispersion across individual analysts’ earnings forecasts that I use,
denoted Disp, is the mean of the coefficient of variation in the forecasts of earnings per share for
each accounting period (Bond and Cummins, 2004). A scale invariant measure for each
coefficient of variation is warranted because the variation across firms in the level of earnings
per share reflects measurement in arbitrary, and economically meaningless, units. It is calculated
from the earliest month on which at least two analysts issue a forecast. The intuition underlying
this measure is that disagreement among analysts is likely to be lower when a firm’s future
profits are more certain. Since we observe only the mean and the standard deviation of the
distribution, we are somewhat limited in the measures of relative dispersion we can compute.
Practical considerations call for focusing on disagreement in the one-year-ahead forecasts;
typically, we observe more analysts issuing forecasts for profits one year ahead than for longer
time horizons. The Coefficient of Variation (CV), for the period indicated, expressed as a percent
of the absolute value of the mean estimate, is a measure of the relative dispersion of estimates
around the mean estimate. A small CV indicates a tight consensus (or, much agreement among












where _x is the mean forecast, that is, the arithmetic average of estimates for the fiscal period
indicated and S is the standard deviation, that is, the basic statistical measure of dispersion of
estimates for the fiscal period indicated. The standard deviation is the average variance from the
mean expressed in local currency.














Table 2 displays summary statistics for the various accounting measure. The figures represent
averages (medians) of firm’s averages (medians) over the years. The data are not skewed at all,
since the mean and median values roughly coincide. Notably, Tobin’s Q has a mean (median) of
1.70 (1.46), which implies that the average (median) firm has valuable performance, and thus
potentially facing under-investment problems. However, Q varies widely across firms as
evidenced by the inter-quartile range of 0.75.
Table 3 contains a matrix of pairwise correlation coefficients among the alternative proxies
chosen for Tobin’s Q, Leverage, Tangibility, Profitability, Size and the measure of Forecasts’
Dispersion. The matrix gives also Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all potential exogenous
variable. There does not appear to be high correlation between any two of the explanatory
variables. The only exception is between Profitability and Q, with correlation value higher than
50%. Importantly, the correlation between Leverage and the Dispersion measure is negative and
significant, the same between Leverage and Tobin’s Q. While the former result is consistent with
the main prediction of the agency model of previous section, the latter contrasts with a
disciplining and value-enhancing role for leverage and suggests that the relationship between
leverage and performance should be subject to further empirical scrutiny.
Finally, to assess more directly whether multicollinearity is present, the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) procedure is undertaken.
30 As can be observed from Table 3, none of the VIF values
exceeds two, confirming that the sample data do not suffer from multicollinearity.
30VIF(X k ) can be interpreted as the ratio of the actual variance of the estimated coefficient, VAR(X k ), to what it
would have been in the absence of multicollinearity. In the latter case, the coefficient of multiple determination, R
2
k ,
in a regression of the explanatory variable, X k , on all other explanatory variables, is zero.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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Table 2 Summary statistics for financial data (all firms)
Characteristic Mean Median St. dev. IQR
*
Q 1.70 1.46 0.81 0.75
Lev 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.16
Tang 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.28
Prof 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.08
Size 13.7 13.6 1.27 1.7
Disp 7.75 4.95 9.65 5.35
The summary statistics are for an unbalanced panel dataset of 188 firms (1111 firm-year observations) from 1996 to
2005.
Tobin’s Q (Q) is the ratio of the value of the firm divided by a proxy for the replacement value of assets. Market
Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to market value of total assets. Tangibility (Tang), is the ratio of net property
plant and equipment to total assets. Profitability (Prof) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets, in 1996 million pounds.
* IQR is the interquartile range, the distance between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile.
Table 3 Correlation Matrix for Financing Data






















The correlations are for an unbalanced panel dataset of 188 firms from 1996 to 2005 (1,111
firm-year observations).
Tobin’s Q (Q) is the ratio of the value of the firm divided by a proxy for the replacement value
of assets. Market Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to market value of total assets.
Tangibility (Tang) is the ratio of net property plant and equipment to total assets. Profitability
(Prof) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total assets.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets, in 1996 million pounds.
* Indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level or higher.
** VIF=1/(1-R
2 ) is the Variance Inflation Factor, where R
2 is derived from a regression of the
explanatory variable listed on the left most column on a constant and the rest of the explanatory
variables.
8 The empirical results
8.1 Baseline specification
As can be seen from Table 4 below, the suggested instruments for the first-stage equation show a
highly significant effect in the leverage equation. The soundness of the empirical specification isAlessandro Fiaschi
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confirmed by a number of tests, including the Sargan-Hansen test aimed at verifying the validity
of the specification.
The sign of the coefficient of Dispersion is consistent with the main prediction of the
theoretical model of previous sections. This measure of variance is equivalent to an uncertainty
in expectations. An empirical concern is that it is possible for future profits to be highly
uncertain, in the sense that the distribution perceived at a particular point in time has a high
variance, and yet for the expectation of future profits to be completely stable, if no relevant new
information is revealed during a particular time interval. It is clearly possible for the level of
future profits to be highly uncertain, and yet to observe a set of analysts using similar
information in a similar way, with similar objectives, arriving at a similar set of issued forecasts.
Nevertheless, theoretical reasons explained above let us expect the tendency to be for more
observed disagreement to be associated with more underlying uncertainty.
As to other results, I find a significant negative relationship between leverage and current
profitability. To the extent that realized profitability is correlated with profitable growth
opportunities and managerial ability, this evidence is consistent with the agency approach.
Nonetheless, it is consistent with pecking order theory, since this theory predicts that more
profitable firms have more internal resources and therefore, rely on less external financing,
including debt.
31 Although we should be careful about the precise measure of leverage employed
in each research to make a comparison (I adopt a measure of market leverage), most empirical
studies confirm the observed sign, finding a negative relationship between leverage and
profitability.
32
Leverage results positively correlated with tangibility and size. The sign of tangibility may
be at odds with the free-cash-flow hypothesis, since - as explained - the monitoring costs tend to
be higher for firms with less collateralizable assets (i.e. lesser tangibility). However, the result
may be driven by other considerations, since collateral value is a major determinant of the level
of debt finance available to companies (Harris and Raviv, 1990). A positive relationship between
31For a deeper discussion on this theory, see section 2.4.
32For example, Toy et al. (1974), Kester (1986), Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and
Zingales (1995) for G7 companies except for Germany, Wald (1999), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Bevan and
Danbold (2000), Booth et al. (2001), Huang and Song (2002), and Gaud et al. (2005). Frank and Goyal (2004),
among the few, experience positive relationship between profitability and leverage in some models.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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debt and collateral assets is also broadly consistent with a large body of the empirical literature:
Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) uncover
evidence of a significant positive relationship between tangibility and total gearing, while Marsh
(1982) and Walsh and Ryan (1997) find the probability of debt issues to be positively related to
the fixed asset ratio.
33
Instead, the positive relationship between size and debt is consistent with agency theory. It is
argued that larger firms may have lower agency costs associated with the asset substitution and
the under-investment problems (Chung, 1993). A further reason for smaller firms to have lower
leverage ratios might be that smaller firms are more likely to be liquidated when they are in
financial distress (Ozkan, 1996). To the extent that larger firms are less likely to be liquidated
following poor performance, agency theories suggest that higher leverage may be needed to
provide managerial incentives in these firms. Again, empirical studies provide support to this
sign.
34
The results for the Q equation are also broadly as expected. Q is positively related to current
profitability and negative with size, perhaps reflecting the fact that large firms have lower growth
opportunities. The key thing to note is that leverage is found to have a significantly negative
impact on firm performance. One might argue that this result is apparently at odds with a
disciplining and value-enhancing role for leverage. In particular, it might suggest that low-
growth firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure, in contrast with what would be
expected on the basis of Jensen’s free-cash-flow hypothesis. I disagree with this contention and I
now provide evidence that lends support to the agency approach.
33More recently, Chittenden et al. (1996) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002; 2004) find the relationship between
tangibility and gearing to depend on the measure of debt applied, so this result is open to further research.
34At the aggregate level, Crutchley and Hanson (1989), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Barclay and Smith (1996), and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find a significant positive correlation between company
size and gearing, while Marsh (1982) observes that debt issues are positively correlated with company size. Barclay
and Smith (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) all find debt maturity to be
positively correlated with company size. However, Remmers et al. (1974) found no size effect and Kester (1986)
reports an insignificant negative correlation between gearing and company size.Alessandro Fiaschi
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Table 4 Instrumental variable regression on panel data for Leverage and Q (all firms)

















Legend: Tobin’s Q (Q) is the ratio of the value of the firm divided by a proxy for the
replacement value of assets. Market Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to market
value of total assets. Tangibility (Tang) is the ratio of net property plant and equipment
to total assets. Profitability (Prof) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets,
in 1996 million pounds.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
8.2 Sample splitting
The finding that less leveraged firms have on average a lower performance might be analyzed in
greater detail by testing for the presence of non linearities in the relationship between financial
structure and agency costs of managerial discretion. The argument in favor of these non
linearities is that the whole sample regression may uncover a degree of difference across firms in
the sensitivity of Tobin’s Q to leverage. A natural way to address this issue is by splitting the
entire sample of firms according to some exogenous characteristic and investigating whether the
estimated effect of leverage on the performance variable varies across the two groups of firms
and is magnified by the presence of this characteristic.
The hypothesis I test here is whether the negative Q-leverage relationship is weaker for
firms with a large size. The rationale for this hypothesis is that conflicts of interest between
manager and shareholders are potentially more important in the case of large size, which we have
seen to be a statistically significant variable in the performance regression. On the theoretical
side, Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are more likely to prevail in large mature firms.
Thus, if debt mitigates agency costs, we would expect large firms to show a less negative or a
positive coefficient on leverage in Q equation.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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Following Bond et al. (2004) the sample split is achieved as follows: each firm is assigned
to a high (resp. low) category according to its position in the first year it enters the sample
relative to the median across all firms in the first year they enter the sample. For example, a firm
is categorized as a large size firm if its value in 1996, the first year it enters the sample, is above
the median log value of total assets across all firms in the first year they entered the sample.
35
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation on the two different sub-samples. We
find that the effect of leverage on productivity is always negative, but it is higher for firms with a
small size. The estimated coefficient associated to leverage is -5.65 in the sub-sample of firms
with smaller size. On the contrary, the estimated effect is -4.47 in the other sub-sample. At the
same time, uncertainty is negative and significant in the leverage equation. Although the sign
between leverage and performance is not comfortable, certainly it comes closer to agency cost
theoretical predictions.
35I also experimented with several different methods for splitting the sample, which produced similar results.Alessandro Fiaschi
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Table 5 Instrumental variable regression on panel data for Leverage and Q (small vs. large size)
Levit Qit Levit Qit
Small Size Large Size
Levit - -5.65
*** (1.46) - -4.47
* (2.08)
Tangit 0.23
*** (0.07) - 0.08 (0.08) -
Dispit -0.005
*** (0.00) - -0.004
* (0.00)
Profitit -0.45

















Legend: I divide firms in two groups following to this criterion: each firm is assigned to a high (resp.
low) category according to its position in the first year it enters the sample relative to the median
across all firms in the first year they enter the sample (Bond et al., 2004). We adjust the standard
errors for heterogeneity and correlation within different years of the same firm. Variable definitions
for the acronyms are given in other Table.
Tobin’s Q (Q) is the ratio of the value of the firm divided by a proxy for the replacement value of
assets. Market Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to market value of total assets. Tangibility
(Tang) is the ratio of net property plant and equipment to total assets. Profitability (Prof) is the ratio of
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total assets. Size is the natural
logarithm of total assets, in 1996 million pounds.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
8.3 Tobit regression
In order to investigate whether the interplay between leverage and uncertainty on firm’s
performance is sensitive to potential agency costs, I extend my analysis by estimating an
instrumental variable Tobit regression.
In line with agency costs argument, we may argue that the managerial discretion problem is
mainly relevant for firms with bad prospects. Several papers in the past have identified a suitable
proxy by dividing the sample to select for low levels of Tobin’s Q. For example, Hoshi et al.
(1991) distinguish between firms with bad and good prospects of performance, and allow for two
separate cash flow coefficients, in their studying of financial constraint problems. More
interestingly for our research, Vogt (1994) discriminates between asymmetric and managerial
discretion problems by including, among the regressors, an interaction between Q and cash flow,
reporting evidence in support of free-cash-flow theory.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
33
More recently, Doukas et al. (2000)
36 look further into this approach and model potential
agency costs of managerial discretion by an interaction variable of the company’s growth
opportunities with its free-cash-flow. Notably, their measure is employed as the dependent
variable of their estimation. This measure is given by the following calculation. Growth
opportunities are measured as a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for a firm-year
observation if the Tobin’s Q is less than year-by-year cross-sectional mean, and the value of 0
otherwise. Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989), free-cash-flow is measured as operating income
before depreciation minus the sum of taxes plus interest expense and dividends paid,
standardized by total assets. In other words, Agency is defined as Q-dummy multiplied to free-
cash-flow.
37
Model below combines this methodology of selection for potential misconduct of
management, with the instrumental variable approach (used in the baseline specification) to take
care of potential endogeneity problems between leverage and the new measure of low
performance.
A few econometric issues are worth noting regarding the estimation of this kind of model. In
our case, the observed dependent variable takes the form:
38
 if 0 if 0 Agency Agency Agency Agency
     
being Agency
 the latent dependent variable of interest. That is, as in Doukas et al. (2000), the
measure of potential mismanagement is a zero-inflated continuous variable. In light of this
approach, I re-estimate the baseline equation for the variable Agency, so that the model can be
presented as follows:
  max 0 it it a a it a i it
it lev it lev it lev i it
Agency u Lev
w Lev
   
   
       

      
X
Z X
36Also, Doukas et al. (2005).
37As Doukas et al. (2005: 499) state: "(...) poorly managed firms are more likely to be exposed to higher agency
costs than well-managed firms and consequently waste free cash flows in negative NPV projects, while well-
managed firms are expected to be involved in value-maximising activities where free cash flows are not expected to
be wasted. Specifically, a high value for the interactive Agency variable would be indicative of a firm with high
agency costs arising from the existence of high free cash flows at the discretion of its managers and being poorly
managed."
38See, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 532).Alessandro Fiaschi
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As to the empirical specification, while the instruments of the leverage equation are the
same of the basic model, I now drop from both equations (that is, from matrix it X ) the
profitability variable, since it is by definition collinear with free cash flow (they are also
correlated over 90%).
Testing for this model by a Tobit regression, I find an insignificant effect of firm’s size
(result not reported), due to possible misspecification problems. I accounted for this and I tried to
solve the problem in several ways. The inclusion, among it X variables, of squared-Size, to
account for possible curvilinear effects on agency costs,
39 solves the misspecification problem
and gives my final estimation.
Regression results are given in Table 6, for which I can’t use the fixed-effect instrumental
variable estimator.
40 A Wald test does not reject the endogeneity of firm leverage. The most
striking finding is that the estimated effect of leverage on the Q-based Agency variable, which is
now positive and significant.
Therefore, the censored model allows us to select situations where leverage explains better
its discipline device role. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the instruments of the
first stage equation preserve the sign of the previous estimation and are significant at the 1
percent level. In particular, consistently with our a priori, dispersion of earnings’ forecasts exerts
a constraining effect on leverage.
39Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003), use firm size and its square to control for the effect of credit quality on
debt maturity. Diamond (1991) predicts a positive coefficient for firm size since larger firms have higher credit
quality and can obtain long-term debt. The nonlinear relation predicted by Diamond implies that the square of firm
size is expected to have a negative coefficient.
40In fact, there is no command in Stata for a parametric conditional fixed-effects Tobit (with or without instrumental
variables) model, as there does not exist sufficient statistics allowing fixed effects to be conditioned out of the
likelihood.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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Table 6 Instrumental variable Tobit regression on panel data for Leverage and Q
















Legend: Wald test of exogeneity: 1.25 (P-val. 0.06)
Tobin’s Q (Q) is the ratio of the value of the firm divided by a proxy for the replacement value of assets. Market
Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to market value of total assets. Tangibility (Tang) is the ratio of net property
plant and equipment to total assets. Profitability (Prof) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets, in 1996 million pounds.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
9 Concluding remarks
Building on the seminal agency-cost model laid out by Stulz (1990), this paper explores both
theoretically and empirically the implications of the free-cash-flow hypothesis under cash flow
uncertainty. Stulz shows that debt can mitigate the managerial incentive to over-invest, but at the
cost of having under-investment in certain states of nature, hence an equity holders’
maximization problem. Whilst preserving this trade-off scheme, the model above extends this
baseline framework to include situations where there is uncertainty surrounding the mean of the
cash flow.
This simple, yet realistic, extension increases the manager’s information and, thus, her
ability to pursue value-decreasing investment opportunities, even in presence of an independent
board having control over financial decisions and allowing for managerial risk-aversion. It is
shown that the magnitude of value-reducing actions decreases with the precision of the
shareholders’ estimate of the mean of the cash flow.
The interpretation of the capital structure optimization problem in a context of expected
uncertainty lead also to some empirically testable hypotheses. First, the ability of debt to restrict
managerial discretion is dependent upon the precision of the estimate of the cash flow
distribution, so firms with high variance between different financial analysts’ predicted value ofAlessandro Fiaschi
Author
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future cash flow (or earnings), should be observed to carry less debt in their capital structures.
Second, stakeholders could force the debt to be repaid immediately and then reissue debt after
reassessing their estimate of the mean of the cash flow. This is consistent with the argument that
firms typically use bank debt instead of private debt because private debt can be renegotiated
outside of bankruptcy (Diamond, 1994).
The relationship between leverage and uncertainty is later explored on the empirical side. In
this part, the paper provides new evidence supporting a causal link between leverage and
performance, showing how the interplay of earnings forecasts uncertainty and financing choices
impinges upon firm valuation. Consistently with the theoretical predictions, it is found a
significant causal relationship from a dispersion of earnings’ forecasts to firm’s leverage, but
leverage exerts a constraining effect on firm’s performance. Although this result is consistent
with some previous evidence, it contradict the agency-cost story.
The last part of the empirical analysis further investigates whether the uncovered negative
relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q is driven by firms’ heterogeneity in growth
opportunities and agency characteristics. To this purpose, it is estimated a censored normal
regression model where the dependent variable is a measure of potential agency costs, proxied
by an indicator of low growth opportunities multiplied by balance sheet’s free cash flow. The
results of the new specification are consistent with agency costs literature indications, since the
censored model lends empirical support to the view that the leverage plays a positive effect in
reducing the potential non-value-maximizing conduct of managers. At the same time, the
negative coefficient of cash flow uncertainty in the first stage leverage equation remains
statistically significant.
A notable feature of this empirical investigation is that the leverage-uncertainty relationship
uncovered on data extends previous evidence on the role of security analysis as an agency-cost
monitoring device, which has been largely unexplored in the literature. This omission is
surprising in light of investors’ extensive use of analyst earnings forecasts in investment
decisions and of the great influence these forecasts (rather than historical measures of growth)
have on stock prices. Previous evidence, usually based on variables such as the number of
analysts following stocks (e.g. Chang et al., 2006), finds only a generic effect of the presence of
security analysts in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership andManagerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
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control, as conjectured by the original contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The
empirical results of this article suggest that the degree of uncertainty surrounding earnings
distribution, here expressed by the dispersion of U.K. security analysts’ earnings forecasts, is an
important factor in the decision to resort to debt by non-financial firms.
Lastly, these findings have some policy implications, as they suggest that interventions
favoring financial markets’ transparency and information disclosure may have substantial effects




Shareholders maximize the Value of the firm (i.e. the expected discount values of future cash
flows):
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Appendix 2
If we postulate that, given a positive value of debt, V is increasing in F , that is:
1 2
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then the first derivative of F is positive near 1 2 F m     . It follows that the second derivative is
negative for all non negative values of F given 1 2 F m     . The second derivative, with respect
to F, is:
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Since ( ) V F m  is globally strictly concave, it follows that, where ( ) 0 F V F




From Appendix 1, we know that the Value of the firm is:
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The first derivative of this value function ( ) V F m  , with respect to debt choice, F , is:
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The symmetry of the normal distribution is significant in deriving the first derivative. The
update belief about the mean of the cash flow distribution, m
, appears in the first derivative, butAlessandro Fiaschi
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only in expression with the posterior of the mean, (m m
  ). The symmetry of the normal
distribution guarantees that a priori these expressions are zero.
From the proof of Proposition 1, a unique interior solution to the manager’s maximization
problem exists, therefore by the implicit function theorem the comparative static results are as
follows:




V g F g F m m I
dp
    

           
being 0 I
  ,








         (i)
2 2 1 1 ) 0 0 ( ) ( G B F I
dF
V p g F p g F m m I
dI
     


            (ii)
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 ) 0 ( ) ( ) (
0
G G B F m V p p p g F g F g F m m m I
dF
dm
         


          
 
(iii)
being 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( g F g F m m I    
      
1
2 2 2 1 1 1
1
) 0 ( ) ( ) (
0
G G B F V mp g F mp g F mp g F m m m I
dF
d





          
 
(iv)
being 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( g F g F m m I    
      
2
2 2 2 1 1 1
2
) 0 ( ) ( ) (
0
G G B F V p g F p g F p g F m m m I
dF
d





          
 
(v)
being 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( g F g F m m I    
      
Q.E.D.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies with cash flow uncertainty
41
Appendix 4
In this case, the realization of cash flow is greater than the estimated mean, or 1 R m  . The
manager without updating would invest the difference between the realized cash flow and the
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The ability of the manager to update his belief exacerbates the managerial discretion costs.
The manager updates following the Bayesian updating rule
   
* * * *
1 1 2 1 1 2 0 R I F m R I F m               
By simple arithmetic, the additional amount the manager invests is:
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Appendix 5
In this case, the realization of cash flow is less than the estimated mean, or 1 R m  . The manager
without updating would invest the difference between the realized cash flow and the amount of
cash held for future debt payment. Any investment financed before I
 is value-decreasing, or:
 
* *
1 1 2 0 R I F m        
The ability of the manager to update his belief exacerbates the managerial discretion costs.
The manager updates following the Bayesian updating rule
   
* * * *
1 1 2 1 1 2 0 R I F m R I F m               
By simple arithmetic, the amount the manager under-invests is:
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In the case of the Proposition 3 the cost of additional over-investment is:
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The first derivative in respect to the variance of the estimated mean of cash flow,
2  , is:
2














It is greater than zero. Thus, the additional over-investment is increasing in the precision of
the estimate of the mean of the cash flow distribution.
The cost of additional under-investment is:
2
2 2 1 1) 1 (




       
The first derivative in respect to the variance of the estimated mean of cash flow,













As above, it is greater than zero. Thus, the additional under-investment is increasing in the
variance of the estimate of the mean of the cash flow distribution.
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